

RSA[®]Conference2019

San Francisco | March 4–8 | Moscone Center



BETTER.

SESSION ID: CSV-F01

Securely Deploying Micro Services, Containers & Serverless PaaS Web Apps

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Chief Operating Officer
Sense of Security
@ITsecurityAU



#RSAC

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1	Serverless, Microservices and Container Security	4	CI/CD Integration for Automated Security
2	Key Implications for Penetration Testing Programs		End to End Vulnerability Management
3	Key Security features for Container Deployments		Continuous Monitoring, Governance & Compliance Reporting

Are Containers As Good as it Gets?

Cloud containers are designed to virtualize a single application

*** Modified *** <https://searchcloudsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Cloud-containers-what-they-are-and-how-they-work>

As Good as it Gets?

e.g., you have a MySQL container and that's all it does, provide a virtual instance of that application.

*** Modified *** <https://searchcloudsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Cloud-containers-what-they-are-and-how-they-work>

As Good as it Gets?

Containers *****SHOULD***** create an *isolation boundary* at the application level rather than at the server level.

*** **Modified** *** <https://searchcloudsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Cloud-containers-what-they-are-and-how-they-work>

As Good as it Gets?

This isolation *****SHOULD***** mean that if anything goes wrong in that single container (e.g., excessive consumption of resources by a process) it only affects that individual container and not the whole VM or whole server.

***** Modified ***** <https://searchcloudsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Cloud-containers-what-they-are-and-how-they-work>



← → ↻ Secure | <https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/security/>

 docker docs [Guides](#) [Product manuals](#) [Glossary](#) [Reference](#) [Samples](#)

- Get Docker ▾
- Get started ▾
- Develop with Docker ▾
- Configure networking ▾
- Manage application data ▾
- Run your app in production ▾

Docker security

Estimated reading time: 10 minutes

There are four major areas to consider when reviewing Docker security:


- the intrinsic security of the kernel and its support for namespaces and cgroups;
- the attack surface of the Docker daemon itself;
- loopholes in the container configuration profile, either by default, or when customized by users.
- the “hardening” security features of the kernel and how they interact with containers.

Container Security – Tech Neutral

Security Requirements	Addressed By
Intrinsic Security of the Kernel	Supply Chain Risk Mgt/ Vuln Mgt/ CaaS
Attack Surface Reduction	Hardening/Config Mgt/Vuln Mgt
Container Configuration	Configuration Management
Hardening of the Kernel and how it interacts with Containers	Hardening


Monolithic vs Microservices Architecture

MONOLITHIC ARCHITECTURE



Monolithic vs Microservices Architecture

MICROSERVICES ARCHITECTURE




Monolithic vs Microservices Architecture


MONOLITHIC
ARCHITECTURE




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
Monolithic vs Micro Services (API Centric)




Monolithic vs Micro Services (API Centric)




Example: Microsoft eShop Reference Architecture



Example: Microsoft eShop Reference Architecture




VM vs. Containers (where the abstraction occurs)



Increasing order of Complexity




Increasing order of Abstraction




Layers of Abstraction
19


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
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
Layers of Abstraction




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
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
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
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
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
Layers of Abstraction




Layers of Abstraction



Layers of Abstraction



Layers of Abstraction



Web forms

Home > Publish > Web forms > Edit Web form [Go back](#)

Builder

Name [Preview](#)

[Fields](#) [Design](#) [Settings](#) [Share](#)

[Contact](#) [Company](#) [Extra fields](#)

Email	First name
Last name	Cell phone
Phone	Title
Role	USER Status
MyCustomFieldJG	

Email

Cell phone

[Save](#) [Save & Close](#)

Developers



Hackers

RACE TO THE BOTTOM

Hooking Lowest Wins

NtCreateFile (Original)

```
mov eax, 0x42  
mov edx, 0x7FFE0300  
call dword ptr ds:[edx]  
return 2C
```

NtCreateFile(Hooked)

```
jmp MaliciousCode  
mov edx, 0x7FFE0300  
call dword ptr ds:[edx]  
return 2C
```

Malicious Code

```
(Malicious Code Here)  
....  
....  
jmp OriginalBytes
```

Original Bytes

```
mov eax, 0x42  
jmp NtCreateFile+5
```


KEY:

- Original Code
- Malicious Code

(The instruction "mov eax, 0x42" is 5 bytes)

(The instruction "jmp MaliciousCode" is also 5 bytes)

North-South & East-West Attacks



Break-In



Entry Point is usually a “Pin Hole” issue



For example a known application issue



VAULT DOOR
WEIGHT: 22 1/2 Tons
THICKNESS: 22 inches
STEEL: 11 Layers of Special
Cutting and Drill Resistant
LOCKS: 4 Hamilton Watch
Movements for Time Locks

Containers – The “Contained” Challenge

IF you can Break-In




**You then Need to
Break-Out**

<goWest



goEast>

Either Find a Container Vuln & Exploit



Recent Container Vulnerabilities

Introduction (CVE-2019-5736)

Today, Monday, 2019-02-11, 14:00:00 CET CVE-2019-5736 was released:

The vulnerability allows a malicious container to (with minimal user interaction) overwrite the host runc binary and thus gain root-level code execution on the host. The level of user interaction is being able to run any command (it doesn't matter if the command is not attacker-controlled) as root within a container in either of these contexts:

- *Creating a new container using an attacker-controlled image.*
- *Attaching (docker exec) into an existing container which the attacker had previous write access to.*

- <https://brauner.github.io/2019/02/12/privileged-containers.html>

Recent Container Vulnerabilities

CVE-2019-5736 Is a Very Very Very Bad Privilege Escalation to Host Root

CVE-2019-5736 is an excellent illustration of such an attack. Think about it: a process running **inside** a privileged container can rather trivially corrupt the binary that is used to attach to the container. This allows an attacker to create a custom ELF binary on the host. That binary could do anything it wants:

- could just be a binary that calls `poweroff`
- could be a binary that spawns a root shell
- could be a binary that kills other containers when called again to attach
- could be `suid` `cat`
- .
- .
- .

- <https://brauner.github.io/2019/02/12/privileged-containers.html>

Recent Container Vulnerabilities


December 06, 2018

Severe Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in Kubernetes (CVE-2018-1002105)

Earlier this week, a [severe vulnerability in Kubernetes \(CVE-2018-1002105\)](#) was disclosed that allows an unauthenticated user to perform privilege escalation and gain full admin privileges on a cluster. The CVE was given the high severity score of 9.8 (out of 10) and it affects all Kubernetes versions from 1.0 onwards, but fixes are available for recent versions.

The first to discover this vulnerability was [Darren Shepherd from Rancher](#), and it was quickly fixed by the community with updates to the major upstream K8s releases v1.10,

Or - Living off the Land









Low TTL Bi-Product

Hacked container may very soon be pulled down.

Much harder for hacker persistence.

Ability to refresh environment quickly – Vuln Mgt improvements
e.g. Secure @ Source

Low TTL Challenge

Hard for Forensics and
Monitoring

Vuln Mgt – environment
constantly changing

Config Mgt – environment
constantly changing

Container TTL


Low TTL Bi-Product	Low TTL Challenge
Hacked container may very soon be pulled down.	Hard for Forensics and Monitoring
Much harder for hacker persistence.	Vuln Mgt – environment constantly changing
Ability to refresh environment quickly – Vuln Mgt improvements e.g. Secure @ Source	Config Mgt – environment constantly changing

Content Slide Layout

Play

App6


Time Interval 6



Play

App6

Time Interval 6



How to Upgrade your Vuln Mgt Program


What to expect from a Pen Test	Implications for CaaS
Supply Chain Risk	DevSecOps

Pen Test – Mechanical Attack vs Knowledge & Finesse




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
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


MICROSERVICES ARCHITECTURE





MONOLITHIC ARCHITECTURE






MICROSERVICES ARCHITECTURE






<https://neuvector.com/run-time-container-security/>








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































Hack Transformation



Hack Transformation





<https://neuvector.com/network-security/next-generation-firewall-vs-container-firewall/>

Security Testing Needs to Go Down The Stack



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
User Interface (WebApps, forms, logons, API's)



Security Testing Needs to Go Down The Stack

User Interface (WebApps, forms, logons, API's)

Framework (Struts, Spring, .NET)





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Language (Java, PHP, .NET)





AppServer (IIS, Apache, Nginx)

Security Testing Needs to Go Down The Stack



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
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
Language (Java, PHP, .NET)

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
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Process App (Container, application processing)

Process BackEnd (Container, database)

Operating System (Linux, Windows)

Security Testing Needs to Go Down The Stack



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Process BackEnd (Container, database)

Operating System (Linux, Windows)

Clustering/Orchestration (CaaS, Swarm, Kubernetes)

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
Process BackEnd (Container, database)

Operating System (Linux, Windows)

Clustering/Orchestration (CaaS, Swarm, Kubernetes)

Networking (SDN, SecGroups)

Security Testing Needs to Go Down The Stack



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
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Cloud Platform

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
Clustering/Orchestration (CaaS, Swarm, Kubernetes)

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Cloud Platform

Core Infrastructure

Security Testing Needs to Go Down The Stack



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AppServer (IIS, Apache, Nginx)

Process UI (Container, presentation layer)

Process App (Container, application processing)

Process BackEnd (Container, database)

Operating System (Linux, Windows)


Clustering/Orchestration (CaaS, Swarm, Kubernetes)

Networking (SDN, SecGroups)

Cloud Platform

Core Infrastructure

Security Testing Needs to Go Down The Stack



User Interface (WebApps, forms, logons, API's)

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
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Finesse







Lower Cost

Predictable

Even if a Web App/Service Pen Test
not suitable for current technologies

Doesn't really assess the threats

More North-South than East-West

Check Box



More considered

Requires expert capability, R&D


Requires understanding of the full stack incl implications of -aaS

Requires persistence in an ephemeral setting

Yes – it will cost more

Assurance, Validation & Compliance

There are Pen Tests & There are Pen Tests!



Lower Cost	More considered
Predictable	Requires expert capability, R&D
Even if a Web App/Service Pen Test not suitable for current technologies	Requires understanding of the full stack incl implications of -aaS
Doesn't really assess the threats	Requires persistence in an ephemeral setting
More North-South than East-West	Yes – it will cost more
Check Box	Assurance, Validation & Compliance

Blue Team: Key Steps to App Container Security

1	End-to-End Vulnerability Management
2	Container Attack Surface Reduction
3	User Access Control
4	Hardening the Host OS & the Container
5	SDLC Automation (DevOps)

Solutioning

1 End-to-End Vulnerability Management

Automated Vuln Mgt

#RSAC




Image adapted from Qualys materials

Hosts

Filter hosts by status:

All

Filter hosts by compliance:

All

Filter hosts by CVE:

All

Search by:

Name

Name

k8

Vulnerability ▾

Severity

Resource Type

Resource

> CVE-2019-7308

Medium

DEB Package

linux-azure

> CVE-2019-7308

Medium

DEB Package

linux-azure

> CVE-2019-6133

Medium

DEB Package

linux-azure

> CVE-2019-6133

Medium

DEB Package

policykit-1

> CVE-2019-6133

Medium

DEB Package

policykit-1

> CVE-2019-6133

Medium

DEB Package

linux-azure

▼ CVE-2019-5736

High

DEB Package

runc

Resource:

runc

Description:

[runc container breakout]

Fix Version:

1.0.0~rc2+docker1.13.1-0ubuntu1~16.04.1

Solution:

Upgrade package runc to version 1.0.0~rc2+docker1.13.1-0ubuntu1~16.04.1 or above.

Aqua Score:

7.2 High

Solutioning

2 Container Attack Surface Reduction



Solutioning

3 User Access Control



Solutioning


4 Hardening the Host OS & the Container



See NIST SP 800-190 and various others incl <https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/docker/>

Solutioning

5 SDLC Automation (DevOps)



Security Testing Needs to Go Down The Stack

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Recap

1	Serverless, Microservices and Container Security		CI/CD Integration for Automated Security
2	Key Implications for Penetration Testing Programs	4	End to End Vulnerability Management
3	Key Security features for Container Deployments		Continuous Monitoring, Governance & Compliance Reporting

Apply What You Have Learned Today – Exec/Procurement

- Next week you should:
 - Reset your review criteria for Penetration Testing
 - Explicitly incorporate testing of Cloud Technologies into your Vuln Mgt Program
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
 - Review suppliers' capability to test Cloud Technologies
 - Develop the Blue Team side of the equation
 - Have A functional Shift Left feature in your Vuln Mgt Program for Cloud
- Within six months you should
 - Have performed an effective Penetration Test on your Cloud investment
 - Fine tune your blue team response to cloud technology attacks

Apply What You Have Learned Today – Pen Testers

- Next week you should:
 - Shortlist all the relevant cloud technologies in use by your clients
 - Re-calibrate your approach to test PaaS and Container
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
 - Demonstrate the ability to breakout of containers
 - Demonstrate the ability to live off the land
- Within six months you should
 - Perfect methods for persistence in highly dynamic environments
 - Determine how to integrate Pen Test with client Blue Team (Purple Team)

RSA®Conference2019

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