

RSA[®]Conference2020

San Francisco | February 24 – 28 | Moscone Center

HUMAN
ELEMENT

SESSION ID: PDAC-R01

What Was Once Old Is New Again: Domain Squatting in 2020



Jeremy du Bruyn

Practice Manager
Sense of Security
@herebepanda

Willem Mouton

Head of Research
Sense of Security
@_w_m__

#RSAC


Agenda

- Story 1: The adventure
 - An introduction to domain squatting and our work to quantify how big of a problem it is.
- Story 2: A cautionary tale
 - How we used domain squatting to gather tons of useful information during our red team exercises.

RSA®Conference2020

Introduction: Domain Squatting 101

Domain Registration Process



Domain Squatting: Goals

Financial Gain

- Sell domain
- Advertising
- Affiliate programs
- ...

Maliciousness

- Phishing
- Malware
- Information leakage/gathering
- ...

Domain Generation methods

- Typosquatting
- TLD “substitution”
- “Missing-dot”
- ”Combo”
- Homoglyphic
 - à, ğ, ŵ
- Abandoned domains
- Homophones
 - bobs-oars.com = bobs-ores.com

FYI: goolge.com

Whois Record for Goolge.com

— Domain Profile

Registrant Org	Google LLC
Registrant Country	us
Registrar	MarkMonitor, Inc. MarkMonitor Inc. IANA ID: 292 URL: http://www.markmonitor.com Whois Server: whois.markmonitor.com abusecomplaints@markmonitor.com (p) 12083895770
Registrar Status	clientDeleteProhibited, clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited
Dates	7,566 days old Created on 1999-06-04 Expires on 2020-06-04 Updated on 2020-01-14
Name Servers	NS1.GOOGLE.COM (has 12,599 domains) NS2.GOOGLE.COM (has 12,599 domains) NS3.GOOGLE.COM (has 12,599 domains) NS4.GOOGLE.COM (has 12,599 domains)

RSA®Conference2020

Chapter 1: The Journey Begins

Some questions we had

- How many domain squatting domains are there?
- Just how big a problem is domain squatting?

The targets



The targets

4,478 targets


3,126 DNS domains

Our approach v0.1

- Sourced 247+ million registered domains
- Squatting categories:
 1. Typosquatting – (Levenshtein distance)
 2. TLD “substitution” (1550+ TLDs)
 3. “Missing-dot” (wwwexample.com)

Levenshtein distance

- Words/domains within 1 “edit” of a target domain



Finding the squatters

- 267,634 possible squat domains identified
 - Typosquatting : 173,512
 - TLD “substitution” : 92,890
 - “Missing dot” : 1,232
- A LOT were legitimate, so we needed to differentiate
 - abc.com is not a squat of abb.com

The journey begins...

RSA®Conference2020

Chapter 2: Categorisation

Let's get with the categories

- Categorized all 267,634 domains
- Manually verified 1000's
- Many, many false-negatives
- Cannot use domain categorization alone

Not always correct

Banking and Finance


The screenshot shows the Axis Bank website with a dark red header. The navigation menu includes 'Personal', 'Business', 'Priority', 'Burgundy', 'NRI', and 'About Us'. Below the menu are links for 'Explore Products', 'Grab Deals', 'Make Payments', 'Bank Smart', and 'Apply Now'. A 'Start a SIP' button and a 'LOGIN' button are also present. The main content area features a large banner for 'Live your dreams with 24x7 PERSONAL LOANS!' with an 'Apply Now' button. Below this is a carousel with 'Dil Se Open', 'Burgundy', and 'Instant Personal Loan'. To the right is a 'My Offers' section for credit cards with an 'Apply Now' button. At the bottom, there is a search bar and a 'Your pre-qualified offers are waiting' banner with an 'Avail Now' button.

Business


The screenshot shows the acxisbank.com website with a light blue header. The main content area is titled 'Related Links' and contains a list of links: 'BANK LOANS', 'LOANS', 'AXIS BANK ACCOUNT', 'BANKING ACCOUNT', 'PERSONAL BANKING', 'BANKS NEARBY', 'BANK CARD', 'BANKING', 'AYAKKABI', and 'ONITSUKA SHOES'. There is also a 'Buy this domain' link and a note about the domain's asking price.

Although sometimes...

Personal Vehicles




Spam URLs



RSA®Conference2020

Chapter 3: DNS

Records collected



DNS Totals

Start of Authority (SOA):	268,130
Name servers (NS) :	757,981
Mail Exchangers (MX):	1,053,492
 Grand Total:	 <u>2,079,603</u>

Largest DNS SOA providers

1. namebrightdns.com
2. uniregistrymarket.link
3. sedoparking.com
4. parkingcrew.com
5. dns.com
6. bodis.com
7. cscdns.net
8. registrar-servers.com

Verification


- Again cross-referenced results with screenshots
- More false-negatives
- Squatters don't all congregate on known "bad" DNS servers
- Squatters also host on "good" DNS servers

We venture forth....

RSA®Conference2020


Chapter 4: Intersection

Correlation



Confirmed squatting domains

- Conservatively identified 45,646 domains
 - Approximately 17% of the total domains




Largest DNS SOA squat providers

1. uniregistrymarket.link.
2. sedoparking.com.
3. parkingcrew.net.
4. dns.com.
5. above.com.
6. bodis.com.
7. parklogic.com.
8. name-services.com.
9. domaincontrol.com.

Top 10 squatted organisations

1. Ares Management (aresmgmt.com)
2. Fogo de Chão (fogo.com)
3. Facebook (facebook.com)
4. Quantum Corporation (quantum.com)
5. Zillow (zillow.com)
6. Coupons.com (coupons.com)
7. Progressive Corporation (progressive.com)
8. Uber (uber.com)
9. The Hartford (thehartford.com)
10. United Airlines Holdings (united.com)




Domain Length: Counts and Squats



Umbrella Popularity List—Top Million Domains



Rank #214,070



RSA®Conference2020

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Remember for later...

Squat domains with MX records: 23,131 (~50%)

Lessons learned

1. Using Levenshtein distance is useful, but expect a lot of data
2. It's difficult to tie a squatting domain back to a specific target
3. It's even more difficult to identify the actual owner of the squatting domain
4. Domain categorisation is not an exact science
5. DNS domains change OFTEN (duh)
6. Squatters employ some creative techniques to hide their infrastructure

Future work - v0.2

- Go bigger:
 - Targets (more stock exchanges)
 - Squat types (combo, abandoned, etc.)
 - Domains list (250 million is not enough)
- Continuous analysis, not point in time
- “Faster” domain categorisation system
 - We played nice, but need something that scales
- Include more features (screenshots, ssdeep, keywords)

RSA®Conference2020

**A Cautionary Tale:
Red Team domain squatting**

RSA®Conference2020

Chapter 1: The Quest for Treasure

Goals

- Find a more intelligent way of identifying useful squatting domains, not as much brute force
- Capitalize on mistakes made by clients and employees
- Gather data passively
 - Email behavior
 - Types of data sent / received
 - Supply chain interactions
 - Contextual information used for social engineering

Problems needed solving

- Large number of candidate domains
- Traditional obvious ones already taken
- Budget of AU\$20 😊 (That's Aus \$\$)

1 United States Dollar equals

1.51 Australian Dollar

Feb 24, 6:56 PM UTC · Disclaimer

1	United States Dol
1.51	Australian Dollar



Data provided by Morningstar for Currency and Coinbase for Cryptocurrency

RSA®Conference2020

Chapter 2: Red Team 2019


The Target

- Multinational Medical service provider
 - Hospital services
 - Pharmaceutical services
 - Doctor and specialist services
 - 5,000+ employees
- Interactions
 - Employees
 - Patient (Medical, financial)
 - Suppliers (Services, Productions and infrastructure)
 - Government (Healthcare, financial and law enforcement)
- Highly sensitive data

Choosing our domain


- Breach data as “validation source”
 - There is lots of it, and mostly free
 - Typo’s in breach data is usually caused by people mistyping their own email address
 - Typo domains with multiple occurrences in breach data is typically a good indication
- Found a target domain with multiple unique accounts (Lots of employees making the same mistake)

The Setup




General Statistics

- First email received within 2 min
- 10,000+ emails received during 30 day period
- ~2,600 legitimate file attachments (disregarded images from mail signatures, etc.) of these 850 were classed as business related documents
- 12.6% of emails received were from target organization internally




General Statistics

Email Per Day




General Statistics

- First email received within 2 min
- 10,000+ emails received during 30 day period
- ~2,600 legitimate file attachments (disregarded images from mail signatures etc) of these 850 was classed as business related documents
- 12.6% of emails received was from target organization internally




Loot




RunDate: 04/09/2019, Run #43, 09069150-1-WB1R
Reason: BIN NOT OUT

Who Were Sending The Emails



Attachment Breakdown




Leaky MFPs

Subject
Scanned from a Xerox Multifunction Printer
Scan from a Samsung MFP
Scanned from a Xerox Multifunction Printer
Scanned from a Xerox multifunction device
Scanned from a Xerox multifunction device
FW: Scan from a Xerox Phaser MFP
FW: Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
FW: Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
FW: Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
FW: Scanned from a Xerox Multifunction Printer
FW: Scan from a Xerox WorkCentre
Scan from a Xerox Phaser MFP



Supply Chain map



Conversations – Information & Technology



Conversations – Information & Technology



RSA®Conference2020

Chapter 3: Execute plan A! ...B...C

Putting the Information to Work – Plan A

The Phish...


- Phishing campaign
 - Client had aggressive mail filtering rules in place
 - Support emails disclosed the endpoint protection in place
 - Identified several email addresses whitelisted to receive .docm macro enabled documents

Putting the Information to Work – Plan A

The Phish...

- Phishing campaign

- Client had aggressive mail filtering rule in place
- Support emails disclosed the endpoint protection in place
- Identified several email addresses who listed to receive .docm macro enabled documents



CROWDSTRIKE

Putting the Information to Work – Plan B

Hello Bianca, this is Will from FINSupport...

- Telephone campaign (Vishing)
 - Zero success due to heightened client employee awareness
 - Using application support ticket as pretext for call
 - 100% success in convincing target that we are from IT 😊

Putting the Information to Work

Hello Bianca, this is Will from FINSupport...

The screenshot shows an email interface with the following details:

- From:** Bianca [redacted]
- To:** FINsupport [redacted]
- Subject:** Workplan access
- Date:** 2019 05:37:33 +0000 ([redacted])

The email body contains the text: "Afternoon Just wondering if you can please help I don't have access to the workplan application"

Below the text is a screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL: `http://[redacted]/sites/corporate/home/Workplan/default.aspx`. The browser's menu bar includes "File", "Edit", "View", "Favorites", "Tools", and "Help". The page title is "Home - Workplan".

The browser content shows a navigation menu with "Site Actions", "Browse", and "Page". Below this is a large red redaction box. At the bottom of the browser window, there is a navigation bar with links for "Hospitals", "Departments", "For Staff", "IT Services", and "Phonebook", along with a "All Sites" dropdown menu. A banner for "Workplan" is visible at the bottom of the browser window.

Overlaid on the browser window is a "Cannot Start Application" error dialog box. The message reads: "Cannot continue. The application is improperly formatted. Contact the application vendor for assistance." The dialog box has "OK" and "Details..." buttons.

Putting the Information to Work

Hello Bianca, this is Will from FINSupport...

The screenshot shows an email from Bianca to FINsupport regarding 'Workplan access' on May 31, 2019. The email body contains a screenshot of a web browser displaying the Workplan application. The browser address bar shows the URL: `http://[redacted]/sites/corporate/home/Workplan/default.aspx`. The browser interface includes a menu bar (File, Edit, View, Favorites, Tools, Help) and a 'Site Actions' dropdown with 'Browse' and 'Page' options. A red arrow points to a blue square icon with a white double-headed arrow. An error dialog box titled 'Cannot Start Application' is overlaid on the browser, with the message: 'Cannot continue. The application is improperly formatted. Contact the application vendor for assistance.' The dialog has 'OK' and 'Details...' buttons. The background of the browser shows a navigation menu with links for 'Hospitals', 'Departments', 'For Staff', 'IT Services', and 'Phonebook', along with a search box containing 'All Sites'. The 'Workplan' logo and three cartoon figures are visible at the bottom of the page.

Putting the Information to Work

Hello Bianca, this is Will from FINSupport...

The image shows a screenshot of a computer screen with three overlapping windows. On the left is an email window with the following details: From: Bianca, To: FINsupport, Subject: Workplan access, Date: 2019 05:37:33. The email body contains the text "Afternoon" and "Just wondering if you can ple". In the center is a TeamViewer application window. The top bar is blue with "TeamViewer" on the left and "Insert partner ID" and "Connect" on the right. Below the bar is a teal banner that says "Free license (non-commercial use only)". The main interface is divided into three columns. The left column is a sidebar with icons and labels: "Sign In Don't have an account?", "Remote Control" (highlighted), "Remote Management", "Meeting", "Computers & Contacts", "Chat", "Augmented Reality", and "Getting Started". The middle column is titled "Allow Remote Control" and contains fields for "Your ID" (1 [redacted] 0) and "Password" ([redacted]). Below this is the "Unattended Access" section with two checkboxes: "Start TeamViewer with Windows" and "Grant easy access". The right column is titled "Control Remote Computer" and contains a "Partner ID" dropdown menu, two radio buttons for "Remote control" (selected) and "File transfer", and a blue "Connect" button. At the bottom of the TeamViewer window, a green dot and the text "Ready to connect (secure connection)" are visible. On the right side of the screen, a portion of a web browser window is visible, showing a URL bar with "http://[redacted]/sites/cc" and a "Browse" button.



Putting the Information to Work

At the end of the rainbow

- Internal information

- Received onboarding emails containing domain information from HR systems
- Internal Risk management system password reset / registration emails
- Sensitive business and internal documents from multifunction office devices

RSA®Conference2020

Defensive measures

Apply


- Proactive actions
 - Up to date domain inventory
 - Register trademarks
 - Response procedures / takedown playbooks
 - Employee education
- Reactive actions
 - Monitor internet sources for potentially risky domain registrations
 - Identify typo domains within your mail server logs
 - Take control (and keep control) of the riskiest domains

Questions



A CyberCX company

Jeremy du Bruyn
jeremyd@senseofsecurity.com.au



CyberCX

Cyber Security + Customer Experience

Willem Mouton
willemm@senseofsecurity.com.au

